Foreword to

Bureaucratic Representation in the Neo-Weberian State

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The Major argument of the essay below has remained unchanged since it was first written for an international conference on the 'new public management' in 1999, even though much else has. A sea change of sorts has been introduced to the United States public no less than to hundreds of millions of others on the world stage over a period (at this writing) which barely spans 8 weeks and dates from Donald Trump assuming the office of United States President for a non-consecutive second term which began on January 20, 2025.

The essay below was written originally in order to leaven the hyperbolic enthusiasm which had attended the emergence of the 'new public management' not only in the U.S. but also in Canada and elsewhere in Europe as well. Its principal target at the time, one still worthy of sustained, continuous attention, was neo-liberalism. However obvious the substantial differences may be between this anti-philosophy in practice and Trump MAGA populism, they have in common (among other things) a strong anti-bureaucratic refrain directed against the public and social sectors which is often so virulent as to almost defy description, even in a country like the U.S. with a long history of such resentment.

To point out that this attitude to bureaucracies is not based on fact and is indeed almost completely a fiction begs the question why such a view has come to prevail at all, but particularly in the United States. A number of reasons come immediately to mind, including the following. **First**, it purposefully ignores the fact that earlier forms of state administrative organization were in place to serve the interests of nascent capital almost from the very beginning in the form of legal and constitutional structures backstopping founding and organic acts, as well as formal 'higher law' and other documents.

A **second reason** follows directly from the first and underscores the point that these early structures were not considered to be bureaucracies at all, which helps explain why the fiction of 'laissez (nous) faire' came to prevail as an explanation for capital's allegedly free-booting, 'wild west' origins instead. From these two reasons follows a **third**, which may seem fortuitous but really is not. The term 'bureaucracy' was from the very beginning of American political practice seen to apply only to the administrative structures that came into being after earlier forms had played their central role in the establishment of early capitalism, in the U.S. no less than in England and France.

Since these later-to-emerge structures were largely a creature of the extension of the franchise, and indicated the need to provide public and early social infrastructure for a developing nation, they were often fiercely attacked by all elites, including most capitals and their agents and supporters but also by residual landed elements who saw them as a threat to their already precarious hold on power and legitimacy. I have chosen to call them *public sector bureaucracies*, in contrast to the first wave of administrative structures, which I have called *capital sector bureaucracies*. The hallmark of this second wave included the advent of public education as well as public libraries, limited

regulation of capital sector business activities and the beginnings of a merit –for-tenure civil service.

It took sustained recognition of the need to supplant a waning set of highly discretionary practices collectively referred to as private, eleemosynary charity in the interests of system stability and order to bring a third sector, which I call *the social sector*, into being in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, however precarious its organized, bureaucratic footing has been from the very beginning and how subject to cutbacks, and even outright elimination of its services, it has been. The social service sector also remains the very most precarious sector because, in contrast to the public sector, it alone cannot usually be privatized or otherwise placed in private hands because capitals themselves realize that it almost never can be made to yield a profit.

For the answer to the question why has bureaucratic representation based on the persistence of all three sectors been so difficult to eliminate and replace, we need to return to Jefferson's now nostalgic ideal of continuous mass participation, then admittedly restricted to the Yeoman farmer as well as earlier male elite members. It is because no other set of structures combines provision for sustained, and often tenured, employment available to qualified members of the citizenry with participation in the activities of governments that it has fallen to these three sectors of the public or civil service to perform the compensatory representative functions which the idealized mass participation model was not able, for readily understandable reasons, to perform.

Notice that I stated that all 3 sectors perform representative functions, not just the second and third. The representative function performed by the capital sector is no less, and often even more, relevant to explaining the compensatory become permanent role of

bureaucratic representation in capitalist democracies. This is because the capital sector is the first to come into being and is backed up by what Lindblom referred to as 'the privileged position' that capital has always enjoyed as the first sector, one whose guarantee of representation is underwritten by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. While the other two sectors also provide variously effective modes of representation, their purchase on this capability is less secure, and, in the third case comparatively precarious.

While the U.S. is certainly not the only country which exhibits bureaucratic representation of a sustained kind, it does provide a showcase of sorts as evidence of this extremely important social and political phenomenon. The present travails which the second Trump administration is justifiably going through at this writing (March 21, 2025) only underscores how amenable to many forms of violent as well as non- violent opposition vast numbers of Americans have become in response to Elon Musk's ill-advised forays into arbitrary attempts to secure 'efficiencies' in the operation of the American federal government. Even though most of these attempts have imperiled bureaucratic capacities for representation in the second and third sectors, even the first sector has not been immune to these cost-cutting capers.

The ultimate irony is that a significant majority of those 'participating' in these violent and non-violent acts, including the disruption of town halls and local government groups, are individuals and families who voted Trump into his second term. Indeed, the violent actions that are becoming more and more commonplace bear their signature in an explicit way, and only underscore how readily what was earlier touted by pollsters as Trump's deep and solid support can suddenly justify attacks on Tesla automobiles and

dealerships with impunity. It would take us too far afield to try to address why Trump appears so determined to generate chaos, disorder and increasing unpredictability in foreign as well as domestic affairs, but it has led one of his formerly more ardent supporters to claim that Trump wants more than anything else to destroy the United States, a claim that seemed unimaginable only 8 weeks ago.

Bureaucratic Representation in the Neo-Weberian State

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Some Illusions about Bureaucracy, Capitalism and Democracy

This essay could just as well have been titled or subtitled 'Reinventing Government II', for it counters, rather than opposing outright, the position taken in all editions of that study. I have argued elsewhere that the arguments found in *Reinventing Government* are often incorrect or unrealistic on their face and/or historically, culturally and socially limited in their applicability to the U.S. In my view, the thesis and line of argument of this text, far from being problematic only for the Commonwealth and Western Europe, where a strong capital *and* public and social sector is and has been an acknowledged fact of life, challenges many assumptions about American development as well.[1]

In the case of the U.S., it is clear that ideological blinders continue to hinder their ability to acknowledge the pre-eminent role of the state from the very beginning. This is because of the consistent tendency especially there, but in other capitalist democracies as well, to ignore the role of legal and administrative institutions of the state apparatus in the formation, as well as the subsequent growth and extension, of capitalism. These

institutions were early modern forms that anticipated modern secular bureaucracy, but were exclusively or mainly wedded to and reflective of the interests of capital, correctly understood to be the indispensable engine of national economic development. His brilliant analysis of this very phenomenon is yet one more reason why Max Weber's century old analysis of bureaucracy remains unsurpassed in its comparative and theoretical scope, depth and comprehensiveness.[2]

In the event, we have been conditioned to restrict our understanding of bureaucracy to the organizational form that took shape in response to the emerging public, and thereafter social, sectors of the state following on early or successive expansions of the franchise or concerted efforts to halt or contain it. Earlier manifestations of legal and administrative functions directed to assisting capital that date from the very origins of the modern state in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries are either ignored altogether or played down in their significance. That bureaucracy is today so strongly associated with the mode used to organize and administer the public and social sectors alone speaks volumes to the stake that Americans in particular have in the fiction of an economy and market system that antedates what they (conveniently) call 'the state'.[3]

My purpose here follows directly from these earlier studies, and underscores the fact that all bureaucracies, whether capital, public or social in their scope and mandate, perform important, and often indispensable, representative functions.[4] That this often tends to be obscured, or ignored outright, in discussions of the theory, but particularly the practice, of representative democracy only underscores the corollary stake we are all encouraged to have in the assumption of the primacy and priority of electoral modes of

representation. Along with the belief in a governmental system absent of any continuous administrative functions prior to the early or mid 19th century, the assumption that the electoral form of representation is sufficient to the needs of representative democracies is a key illusion that needs to be addressed critically.

We very much need to believe in these illusions, the first about capitalism and the second about representative democracy, for reasons that are not very difficult to discern. Yet it is precisely this need that blinds us to the reality of recent seismic alterations in the system's ability and willingness to represent public and (especially) social interests with the enthusiasm that it now represents those of capital.[5] Reference to capital, public and social functions of bureaucracy theorizes state development by distinguishing three discrete, yet overlapping and cumulative, sets of functions, albeit ones housed in very similar, if not the same, structures.[6] This framework is flexible enough to hold the very different state histories of countries in North America, the Commonwealth and its predecessors and Western Europe. In addition, it hopefully will provide a useful perspective on the actual practice of representation in these systems and the central role of bureaucracy, generically conceived and understood, in its achievement.

Bureaucracy: Capital, Public and Social Functions

The first set of functions, the institutions of capital, are the oldest and most firmly established. They not only date from the origins of the modern secular state itself, but may reasonably be argued to constitute an essential prerequisite for the subsequent success of capitalism. Without doing any more here than alluding to the distinct possibility that the state as we know it in the West came into being precisely for the

purpose of serving the interests of capital, given the needs of national economic development, we can acknowledge the result. Dating from the late 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, provisions granting capital what Lindblom calls a 'privileged position' in the emerging state and societal system can be readily discovered in the numerous laws, constitutions, organic acts and other founding documents of these states.[7]

That the structures of interdependence which emerged during this period would not only be historically prior, but indisputably formative for capital, even in its later, allegedly 'laissez faire', stage, to the point of becoming a stable and defining property of all subsequent capital forms, is difficult to refute. During this formative period of the modern state system, foundations were laid which gained sufficient institutional permanence not just to survive the transition to later economic and political forms, but to adapt themselves to significantly different cultural and religious settings in the process.[8] In short, it is to the historical origins of the modern state itself that we must ultimately turn in order to discover the key element explaining the ascendancy of capital and its institutions across vast stretches of time, space and circumstance down to the present day.[9]

Following on, or coterminous with, either the franchise or its successive expansion, or in an attempt to halt or contain it, a second set of institutions, those of the public, began to emerge in the early and mid 19th century. Capitals in most jurisdictions encountered the prospect of these developments with almost as much dread as they mustered in order to resist all subsequent attempts to organize labour unions and demand that employers engage in 'good faith' collective bargaining practices. Depending on the country and culture under scrutiny, this second set of public institutions included public

libraries, public schooling, limited regulation of business and commercial activity 'in the public interest' and the beginnings of a 'merit for tenure' public service. This new method of supplying 'public administration' is what we nowadays usually mean when we use the term bureaucracy.

That this system was in all instances much more open to occupancy by middle class males who would quickly come to consider it a career only underscores how much less open earlier administrative forms had been. In this earlier case, it is clear that it was mainly those tasks concerned with what would later become the public and social functions of administration that were carried out (if they were carried out at all) by notables or their retainers on a sporadic and intermittent basis. In contrast, capital functions were often engaged in on a relatively continuous basis in a form that often required not only interdependence but outright collaboration and either co-optation or transformation of the apparatus.[10] Although it is probably true that the ascendancy of the institutions of capital did eventually signal the triumph of the middle class, it is important not to lose sight of the successful co-optation that aristocratic notables in virtually all relevant jurisdictions often to regularly realized for their descendants.[11]

Viewed as a developmental process that spanned at least four generations in Europe and the Empire, and two or three in the U.S., we can see how closely related the opening out of state administrative functions and successful or unsuccessful attempts to establish or expand the franchise in fact were. At the same time, and this most consequentially, the emergence of the tripartite system of administrative functions and institutions that one found in all capitalist democracies by 1960 took shape in a way very much at variance from what we normally presume. If at first only capital functions were

being carried out on a consistent and continuous basis by notables and their increasingly middle class retainers, this was later extended to the performance of public and social functions as well. In the process, essential properties of organizational bureaucracy as we presently understand it came into being and subsequently acquired limited to complete legitimacy.

The manner in which public administrative institutions emerged from a sporadic and intermittent mode of performance by notables and their retainers to one characterized by continuous career administration on a merit for tenure basis also holds for the latest-to-emerge set of institutions-the institutions of society. However, in this case, much more than in the case of the institutions of the public, the early history of these functions took the form of *noblesse oblige* by notables and their retainers, a form that was later given transient, and in some cases semi-permanent, life as private charity.[12] These specifically social functions were the last to be institutionalized in the U.S. Their appearance in this form required the emergence not only of general publics with general interests between abstract values and special interests but of the capitalist *society* that only came into being following the Depression and World War II.[13]

Increasing the Capital Sector's Already Pre-eminent Position

This entailed the capture of engineering and thereafter technology and applied science and exponentially increased reliance on the bureaucratic organizational and managerial form, all in a successful attempt to create a capitalist system based on consumption no less than production.[14] Limited representative democracy and/or the rule of law and constitutionalism may have been enough for the earlier institutions of the public to

appear, but the subsequent emergence of the institutions of society required these two additional events. In contrast, but not exclusively so, was Western continental Europe and the United Kingdom and the Empire/Commonwealth. In Europe, and particularly on the Continent, there was a sufficient collective and institutional knowledge and memory of real revolution and related types of violence to guarantee that limited social institutions would come into being in response to the distinct possibility of these events.[15]

Indeed, it has been argued that North America's relative space, separateness and lack of prior Caucasian habitation made it possible for it to significantly alter the state's function in Europe from one almost exclusively concerned with order maintenance to one at least as interested in economic development.[16] While this may seem unrelated to the different but nonetheless complementary ways that the institutions of society developed in Canada and the U.S., it does seem to me to be on point for a number of reasons.[17] Absent the fear of violent, even revolutionary, responses to the exclusion and/or relative deprivation of, large majorities of the population, both countries, but especially the U.S., undertook a new tack. They sought to generate social institutions that would include the poor, weak, aged, needy and unemployed as potential or actual consumers, albeit at the bottom end of the system. This also helped increase the likelihood that those producing the goods and services these families and individuals could now purchase and consume could continue to hold their jobs.[18]

The fact that concerted administrative functions began with the development of the institutions of capital, and only later extended the emerging bureaucratic form to institutions of the public and of society for reasons of order maintenance, economic development or a combination of the two has considerable significance for us today. It

helps explain why neo-liberal parties are downsizing public, but especially social, institutions and functions of the state, while persuading us that there are no capital bureaucratic institutions when it is these institutions that are actually growing and intensifying. The operative fiction here has usually focused on the imperative need for, and often right of, privileged interest group access to government in order to compensate for the power position of what I have called public and social bureaucracy.[19] Once again it is economic development that helps explain why this is happening. As it turns out, the contemporary extension and intensification of the institutions of capital in so many regional, national and supra-national jurisdictions requires the concerted assistance of the state no less than it did in earlier phases of capitalist development.

Indeed, it has been argued that these new needs and requirements have presented capital with a somewhat different set of challenges, one to which it has readily risen. I am referring to the perceived need to more directly co-opt public and social values and institutions that the move to the next higher level of organization and inclusion on the world stage allegedly requires.[20] This objective is clearly aided and abetted by the fact that the strength and permanence of the three sets of overlapping and cumulative, but nevertheless distinct, institutions is directly dependent on how well established and entrenched they are. Thus, it should occasion no surprise to discover that the institutions of capital alone are growing and intensifying, while those of the public, but especially those of society, are being eliminated, downsized, re-engineered, contracted out, privatized or subjected to radically different criteria of eligibility and access.[21]

It also helps explain why social institutions are normally less vulnerable in Europe than in North America, and particularly in the U.S., given the different timing and

rationale for their appearance there, and the vastly diminished fear of violence here. Social institutions at all levels within many or most Continental European states are far more entrenched than they are in North America, where it took a depression of world historical magnitude to install them on a semi-permanent basis. If in the European case it is mainly to order maintenance that we must turn, in the American case it is to economic development, and in particular to the goals and requirements of consumer and managerial capitalism. But there is an additional reason, alongside their greater longevity and greater ideological undesirability, why public institutions are less anathema to neo-liberals than social institutions. For while occasional efforts are made to privatize the performance of social functions, backed up of course by the guarantee that the privateer can only make a profit, never stand a loss, public institutions far more often run a profit or its equivalent and are therefore much more attractive.[22]

While public institutions can be, and often are, turned to a profitable private purpose, usually because they were either already profitable or have been backed up by some form of protection against loss, social institutions are a much less secure bet. The fact that they offend ideologically to a far greater extent in the U.S. in particular, but increasingly so in other jurisdictions as well, probably also constitutes a strike against them. Indeed, it is the fact that some social institutions now offend ideologically even in Continental Europe, given apparently receding concerns there about order maintenance in favour of economic development, that most clearly indicates the impact of neo-liberal policies.[23] Meantime, the efforts of the European Union to counter these tendencies with labour, social and human rights charters and allied provisions often aids and abets neo-

liberal attitudes because of its apparent inability to take its own policies seriously in its ongoing operations.[24]

The process of development that I am suggesting here is one that challenges conventional accounts, and arises largely in response to the fact that history is usually written by those who are deemed to be the winners, however temporary their apparent victory. My overlapping, yet different emphasis seeks to draw attention to the all-important role economic and political-administrative ideology plays in the assumptions these 'winners' regularly encourage us to make. This point is only underscored by a focus on families, generations and institutions, one that only occasionally receives the attention it deserves in disciplines analytically committed to the primacy of the secondary group. It helps us understand how traditional, pre-capitalist elites gradually transformed their families' power base from one founded in land, title and privilege to one founded on either capital alone or on a combination of capital and status. The fact that different bases of power were not necessarily mutually exclusive, and were often held over generations by the same families or their agents, suggests the consequences of treating history exclusively or mainly as if it were a saga of individual development.[25]

Representation: Electoral, Special Interest and Bureaucratic Forms

The foregoing discussion has considerable significance for the theory and practice of representation, for it suggests that interests can be and have been represented in ways that are no less efficacious for not being electoral in form or nature. References attest unambiguously to the fact that pre bureaucratic as well as bureaucratic forms of state administration, backed up and legitimized by organic, founding and constitutional

documents and by laws, have 'represented' individual capitals. That they have also represented capital itself as an emerging, now established, factor of production from the dawn of the modern, secular state in the West, if not before, suggests that this state may even have come into being primarily to perform this function. *It is a historical fact that variations on this theme regarding the state's purpose on behalf of capital were regularly taken for granted by many or most of the leading political economists of the early 19th century, most notably Ricardo, McCulloch and Senior*. Indeed, Marx's critique of the so-called 'minimalist state', and his definition of it as 'the executive committee of the dominant class' originates (like his 'labour theory of value) with the political economists themselves.[26]

In what follows, I shall build upon this point in order to argue that the subsequent emergence of public and social bureaucratic institutions, resulted in, and was also usually intended to, represent social interests different and distinct from those capital interests that had already achieved representation in the ways indicated. Here I have in mind the middle and working classes and the weak, poor, needy and unemployed respectively. Either direct state initiatives, or ones emanating from successive expansions of the franchise, offer further support for this view. These two institutional sets are at least as 'legitimate' as those more established institutions that have represented capital for so long, often for centuries.[27] Having said this, it is nevertheless the case that at present, and whether by accident or by design, public, but particularly social, bureaucratic institutions are in mortal danger of being compelled to compromise or yield up entirely these crucial representative functions. This is largely as a consequence of the neo-liberal policies, strategies and techniques of downsizing already cited, coupled with deregulation and

serious cutbacks in the effective enforcement of labour, health and safety and consumer standards.[28]

There is thus a clear representational deficit that takes place once various modes of downsizing, accompanied by de-regulation and poor to non existent enforcement of standards, have begun to eviscerate the performance of public and social functions by bureaucracies often brought into being precisely for this purpose. These practices, so central to the 'New Public Management', are therefore just as problematic from the standpoint of the representation of public and social interests as they are because of the way they shift collective priorities even more toward the institutions of capital and away from public and social infrastructure. No less important, however, is the observation that this very necessary process of representing public and social, as well as capital, interests constitutes what Robert Merton has called a latent, in contrast to a manifest, function, something present in the operation of all institutions.[29] Indeed, I would argue that the difference between an institution and a mere organization lacking this aspect is precisely that the first not only possesses latent as well as manifest functions, but that they are as, if not more, significant in accounting for its persistence.[30]

A serious slip in our reasoning has occurred that has great significance for anyone interested in the relationship between types of interests and forms of representation, including electoral representation, in present day capitalist democracies. To wit, we are encouraged to move from the correct observation that special interests can be represented in numerous ways, including the electoral, to the thoroughly incorrect, and severely consequential, view that the electoral mode is the only 'legitimate' way that public or social interests can be represented at all. The problem here has few if any sinister features

because it is the now-traditional theory and practice of representative democracy itself that is largely responsible for this narrow view, often to the point of actively promoting it. To be sure, this is more than complemented by the centuries-long process of denial about the role of all non-elected officials, who in the ideal case are supposed to confine themselves to administration rather than policy-making. Resentment of public and social bureaucracy, particularly in the U.S., but more and more elsewhere as well, is fuelled by this often well intended, but nevertheless fictional, view about how governmental, administrative, party and group processes should, and actually do work.[31]

Apart from the fact that the brace of illusions I have cited have arisen from ideological beliefs about democracy, the electoral mode and bureaucracy, they make sense mainly because they constitute indicators of the thoroughness and effectiveness of our indoctrination. The old Soviet joke has Khrushchev telling Kennedy that the real difference between their respective systems was that Americans believed their propaganda, without of course getting into why Americans might be more willing to do this than their Soviet counterparts. Still, the point being made here is not totally devoid of sense, because even if we agree that the electoral mode of representation is the sine qua non without which there would be no other effective modes for representing general public and social interests, something else is clearly required. In effect, we require other, clearly non electoral modes in order to compensate unorganized citizens for the unequal access to group, party, governmental and political resources that is almost always available to capital regardless of the circumstances. This point is only underscored by the fact that Jefferson and virtually everyone who followed him began by presuming that

representative electoral forms could only be effective if they were complemented by active mass citizenship, and an ongoing concern about state, society and economy.[32]

Passive Citizenship and the Need for Bureaucratic Representation

This suggests several things to me that are directly relevant to the matters at hand. First, Jefferson's requirements could only be satisfied where citizenship was an ongoing dynamic activity not confined to the period during electoral campaigns and not limited to voting at a specified time and place. I have argued elsewhere that this latter is at best a passive form of citizenship which amounts to little more than membership, even if it does constitute the pre-eminent form that citizenly activity takes in most capitalist democracies today.[33] It isn't just that I think citizenship should be more continuous, with voting the final act that terminates only one phase of a given exercise of citizenly activity. It has been argued persuasively for over 300 years that this is the only way representative democracy can work at all. Instead, it is my belief that the unrealistic nature of the requirement of 'continuous mass participation' for the effective functioning of representative democracies is at the root of the problem. Indeed, it is signally responsible for our willingness to countenance, seemingly without cavil, the dead-end options of either 'politics as usual' or this unrealistic alternative to it. This means that the traditional contrast between a representative system based on instructed delegates and one based on the presumption of extensive discretion, the so-called Rousseauian and Burkeian models respectively, no longer provides even a minimally adequate description of our political reality.[34]

This is because the real distinction today is between considerable and almost total discretion on the part of elected officials, with the instructed delegate model little more than a nostalgic legacy from an earlier era, if not a complete fiction altogether. More to the point, it is mainly, if not exclusively, to an elected member's relationship *to a political party or a government* that one today applies these terms rather than to his or her relationship to voters in constituencies. For a number of reasons that are readily comprehensible, one can say with confidence that there is far more likely to be a relationship between an elected official and his/her party or caucus than between this person and more than a few of his/her constituents. This is not difficult to understand. In present day capitalist democracies, formal work relationships are much easier to sustain and justify than ones less tied in formal ways to work, however much we might wish to insist that politics and the relationship that ideally should sustain the activity of electoral representation be treated as work.[35] And the blame, if indeed this is the appropriate term to use here, lies at least as much with constituents and electors as it does with those who have been elected to represent them.

What then is to be done, if anything, to remedy this severe, and increasingly consequential, gap between ideal and reality? Perhaps one thing we might do is to remember why Jefferson and his supporters argued that representative democracy could only work if complemented by continuous citizen participation. The answer to this question will require us to resuscitate the distinction between special and general interests, one that used to lie at the heart of the theory of representative democracy, with its assumption that the electoral mode was superior to all others, even direct democracy itself.[36] Representation not only assumes the value and necessity of a continuous and

ongoing relationship, as noted. It also assumes agency, delegation, literally 're-presentation'. From what has been said already we know that interpretations of this concept have undergone significant alterations in the direction of ever greater ties to party, caucus or (in the case of the U.S. and France) branch or chamber, with correspondingly weakened ties to constituents. The issue here is not so much one of which institutional vehicles are employed to articulate general interests. Rather, it is whether there is any longer any incentive to articulate them at all, that is, any sense that general interests, as distinct from both values and special interests, have any role to play in the public and social life of capitalist democracies.[37]

It is my view that these systems cannot for long be expected to continue functioning effectively in the absence of an ongoing articulation of general public and social interests. These interests, alongside the general publics and the society that they presuppose, are for me the corner stone of representative democracy. Without them capitalist democracies will continue to exhibit the conspicuous lack of balance in the relative power and influence of the three sets of bureaucratic institutions that I have alluded to in the foregoing. The serious deficit that we are presently experiencing in public and social life is certainly related in a direct way to the neo-liberal agenda, but I have already noted how significantly the success and permanence of this agenda has depended on citizenly support in one form or another at the ballot box. This electoral support, while certainly not unstinting, *and more often the result of non-participation, if not active alienation from electoral politics altogether, than many wish to admit*, has been consistent for some time.[38] But this hardly solves, or even addresses, the real problem, one that should be no less important for us today than it was for Jefferson in his

time. For it is clear to me that his concerns about the sufficiency of electoral representation to securing and maintaining a free and just political, economic and social order have been magnified exponentially by the present ascendancy of the institutions of capital over public and social institutions.

Supremely relevant to this discussion and to the issues it has attempted to raise is the following question. Given the apparently unrealistic expectations inherent in the requirement that representative democracies be accompanied by dynamic and continuous citizenly activity if they are to function effectively, why then have representative institutions persisted? It is not enough to simply point to some alleged 'lag' between public, social or elite perceptions and the reality of severe dysfunction they have not yet grasped, for whatever reason. Neither is it some conspiracy that elites, or more properly capitals and their henchmen and supporters, are perpetrating on unsophisticated publics and on society itself. Another way of explaining why we still have some balance between capital institutions and those of the public and society, however fragile this balance may be in the present circumstances, could be related to the residual effect of prior secondary socialization. Having said this, however, it is clear that those who continue to dominate among capitals as a group, though still the legatees of this heritage, are rapidly being replaced by people who do not accept the need for institutional balance like many to most of their predecessors.[39] Though this process can be expected to continue, and even to accelerate in the coming years, socialization mainly helps explain the persistence of balance, and why it may be under increased siege in the years to come. It does not tell us what institutions are responsible for this balance.

The Neo-liberal Threat to System Stability

The imbalance resulting from the representational deficit between the growing power of the institutions of capital and the weakening of the institutions of the public, but especially those of society, has not thus far resulted in these systems collapsing like collective 'black holes' for another reason. Earlier I made reference to two concepts from the work of Robert Merton, and now I need to return to them. The first was the phenomenon of unintended and/or unanticipated consequences, and the second was the distinction between manifest and latent functions.[40] A provisional answer to the question as to how and why representative institutions have persisted requires us to avert our fixed stare at, indeed our fixation with, electoral modes of representation. We need to consider the distinct possibility that non electoral modes of representation have made it possible for most capitalist democracies to continue in ways that permit the flagging electoral mode its illusory, and largely symbolic, pre-eminence even as general public and social interests are being co-opted by capital. *In my view, it is bureaucratic representation, exercised through institutions that protect not only the interests of capital but those of the public and society as well, that is presently holding these systems together*.[41]

Perhaps this observation will help explain why I have expressed such concern about some of the more serious ongoing and emerging consequences of the neo-liberal agenda in practice. For the idea that public and social, *as well as capital*, bureaucratic institutions could perform a representative function central to the persistence of capitalist democracies is likely to catch most or all of us at unawares. After all, capital alone benefits from both the right of association that sanctions special interest groups, trade associations and lobbying generally, and from having privileged access to, or recognition

from, state bureaucratic institutions that are longer lived and more securely established than any others. The general publics and society as a whole have neither an effective right of association absent the very government funding that neo-liberal regimes have cut back on or eliminated, nor are their respective bureaucratic institutions as secure as those of capital, even in the best of times but particularly today.[42] I would stand firm on the observation that it is public and social bureaucratic institutions that are the major reason why the present system, however severely unbalanced, continues to represent general as well as special interests, public and social as well as capital interests. These interests are no longer being represented as effectively or well, or at all, by the institutions of electoral representation, even if these institutions do still constitute the sine qua non of representative democracy.

In point of fact, electoral institutions increasingly serve private sector special interests rather than the general publics and general interests that were supposed to be their raison d'etre and ultimate justification. These special interests have persuaded sympathetic parties in government to co-opt, or support the co-optation of, state public and social resources originally allocated to these uses in order to provide them with what amounts to direct assistance.[43] This has in turn been complemented by low voter turnout and wide-ranging political alienation, coupled with the inability of those who support public and social alternatives to it to achieve anything like the simplicity, however misleading, of the neo-liberal message. The result is extensive downsizing, privatization, contracting out, functional 're-engineering' or outright elimination of public, but especially social, services and wide-ranging deregulation of business, alongside poor to non-existent enforcement of standards and codes.[44] The result of this wholesale

reallocation of human and capital resources has been to push the general publics and general interests these special interests no longer value or believe to exist to the social, political and economic margin. It would not be too much to say in light of this that the institutions of representative democracy have been effectively hijacked, albeit with the consistent, if largely unenthusiastic, support of the unorganized citizenry in and through the ballot box. I have attempted to explain why this process, well established in many or most capitalist democracies, did not lead to the kind of collapse that observers since Jefferson have anticipated, but can be expected to do so in the near future if present trends continue.

The central significance of the bureaucratic representation of public and social, as well as capital, interests in capitalist democracies, and the fragility of this increasingly indispensable mode of representation in the present political and economic circumstances is not just an example of unanticipated and unintended consequences. It also constitutes what Merton would probably agree is a case in point underscoring the importance, indeed indispensability, of latent, as well as manifest functions.[45] Not unlike another organ taking over the functions of one that has been injured, disabled or amputated, public and social bureaucracies have attempted, largely successfully, from their respective inceptions until the late 1970's, to compensate for three events. First, the failure of the mass participation model of citizenship that was supposed to complement representative, as opposed to direct, democracy.[46] Second, the privileged position of capital from the very beginning, not only in their interaction with governmental systems through access, lobbying and influence, but inside government as a consequence of the greater strength and longevity of their bureaucratic institutions relative to others.[47] Third, the more recent

way that capital has built upon this privileged position by exploiting the flagging electoral method of representing public and social interests in order effectively to co-opt the state agenda since the late 1970's. To this end, private sector interests have attacked universality, misconceived the so-called 'public' debt, supported downsizing and the rest of the neo-liberal policies cited, and, as a direct result, have persuaded citizens to marginalize central elements of the public and social agenda.[48]

Since the very early stages of this process, beginning in the 1980's, it has become clear that the performance of these latent functions was in serious jeopardy and that efforts to make them more manifest would not be tolerated. At precisely the point-in-time when the public and social functions of the electoral institutions of representative democracy have been sidelined in favour of the ever-increasing needs and demands of capital, the compensatory functions of public and social bureaucratic institutions have come under incessant and unremitting attack. Whether this is intentional, or whether neo-liberals and the capitals who support them really believe that ideological matters are peripheral to allegedly 'objective' *public and societal* concerns about costs, deficits and debt and a given country's bond rating, the results are the same.[49] Nevertheless, and ultimately for reasons of self-interest, it seems to me that the serious problems I have described, whether already before us or on the horizon, are not intended, at least not by the majority of capitals and their supporters. For I sincerely believe that neo-liberals, almost without regard to ideology and beliefs, are just as unaware of the representational deficit and radical institutional imbalance that their policies are bringing about as they are of the reality of bureaucratic representation itself.

Conclusion: Acknowledging Our Imperiled Reality

In light of the observations I have made here, it would seem that the term 'capitalist democracy' is seriously incomplete as a description of the systems that we need to keep intact *precisely because* of emerging supranational, regional and global realities. The balance that I am convinced it is essential we maintain is virtually given in my discussion of the indispensable role played by all three institutional sectors of the state system-the capital, the public and the social. A more accurate descriptive term that took account of the function of all three of these sectors would therefore be 'capitalist democratic society', for it would include the most recent addition to the contemporary state system in the countries under examination as well as the first and second. It seems to me that change is mainly a problem for a society not because it is necessarily problematic in and of itself, but rather because it is allowed to take place in ignorance of the actual structural realities and underlying interdependencies that make society itself possible .

Believing that capital and its institutions can move headlong into the 21st century while making war on public, but especially social, institutions because it does not, after all, really need them, would constitute the supreme illusion for reasons which are obvious rather than counter-intuitive. Durkheim, as usual, got it right when he observed, against both the Utilitarians and the laissez faireists, that social and political solidarity amongst people, far from being the result of exchange relations, is what makes exchange itself possible.[50] To cite a more recent source on these matters, Claus Offe has argued that the balance he believes to be necessary is best understood by reference to a focus on what does and does not make capitalism safe for democracy and democracy safe for capitalism.[51] My addition of the more specifically societal to the term 'capitalist

democracy' would compel me to respond to Offe that now and in the future the real question will increasingly be what does and does not make capitalism safe for capitalism!

Notes

[1] David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government*. How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (New York: Penguin/Plume, 1993, 1997). Although I am opposed both in principle and in practice to the analysis and recommendations offered in this text, its 'new public management' approach does claim to be capable of improving efficiencies to the end of preserving, and even enhancing, the amount and quality of public and social services. My concern, however, is that even in the American setting, forget elsewhere, principals will be all too prone to govern through 'value allocating' responses that will ultimately, if not more immediately, undermine the projected cost efficiencies promised by the authors. The fact that often-to-regularly the private performance of public (and occasionally social) functions is not recorded as a government expenditure for which taxpayers are responsible provides further support for this view, and gives 'official' information on the matter a thoroughly inaccurate ring. A second difficulty regularly follows from the first, that is, the tendency of private vendors to respond to cost and service problems once under contract by either seeking (or seeking further) government subsidies or by engaging in 'market' practices in their absence. This latter is all the more likely wherever the deregulated settings that normally accompany such practices are present. Add to this the authors' unqualifiedly hostile attitude toward 'bureaucrats' and 'professionals', and their nostalgic endorsement of 'community' and 'communities of citizens', and the stage is set for a reversion to the allegedly objective market in circumstances where it is least appropriate. Absent the very public and social sector bureaucrats who are the key to successful implementations, the breakdown of the authors' idealized 'grass roots' approach would follow almost automatically because contracting agents would ignore or seek to amend the contract. In *Bureaucratic Representation*. Civil Servants and the Future of Capitalist Democracies (Leiden: Brill, 2001), I argue that implementation practices, along with constructive discretion and social policies like affirmative action and pay equity, are key features of a non-electoral form of public and social representation that is increasingly indispensable in capitalist democracies. For an analysis and critique of the kind of nostalgia that inspires *Reinventing Government* (at pp. 51-2 and *supra*), something even less realistic for other countries than it is for the U.S., see Roscoe Martin, *Grass Roots*. Rural Democracy in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).

[2] Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, 2 Vols, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), Vol.2, Chap. X, XI, XIV, and XV; Weber, *From Max Weber*, edited by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 196-244; Weber, *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society*, edited by Max Rheinstein (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 330-7, 349-56 and *passim*. Also see H.T. Wilson, 'Technocracy and Late Capitalist Society', in *The State, Class and the Recession*, edited by Stewart Clegg, Geoff Dow and Paul Boreham (London: Croom Helm, 1983).

[3] The classic American, and, to a lesser extent British, complaint about the alleged intransigence *etc*. of the bureaucratic organizational form almost always fails to note its extension and subsequent utilization in virtually every organized endeavour of any size and complexity, no less in the private sector than elsewhere. This was anticipated by Weber *op. cit*. almost a century ago. Also see Herschel Hardin, *The New Bureaucracy*. Waste and Folly in the Private Sector (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1991). In my view, many or most of these complaints about 'bureaucracy', whether from businesspersons, lawyers, journalists or academics, are actually a device for articulating ideological objections to the sorts of things that public, and especially social, bureaucracies do.

[4] H.T. Wilson, *Bureaucratic Representation*. A major inspiration for this line of analysis is Norton Long, 'Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism', in Long, *The Polity* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962), pp. 64-76.

[5] Gary Teeple, *Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform* (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1995); Walter Stewart, *Dismantling the State*. Downsizing to Disaster (Toronto: Stoddart, 1998); John Shields and B. Mitchell Evans, *Shrinking the State*. Globalization and Public Administration Reform (Halifax: Fernwood, 1998).

[6] Wilson, *Bureaucratic Representation*, chapter 1, V.

[7] Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*. The World's Political-Economic Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chapter 1. Generally, see Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, 4 Vols. (New York: Academic Press, 1974, 1980, 1989); Wallerstein, *Historical Capitalism* (London: Verso, 1983); and Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy: Essays* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Also, H.T. Wilson, *Capitalism after Postmodernism*. Neo-conservatism, Legitimacy and the Theory of Public Capital (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

[8] Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800* (New York: Harper and Row 1975); Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th to 18th Centuries*, 3Vols. (London: Collins, 1981-4); and Braudel, *A History of Civilizations* (New York: Lane, 1993). For a more recent discussion of capitalism as a trans-cultural phenomenon of the 20th and future centuries, see Stewart Clegg and S. G. Redding (eds), *Capitalism in Contrasting Cultures* (New York: de Gruyter, 1990).

[9] Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, Vols 1-3; H.T. Wilson, 'Time, Space and Value', *Time and Society*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 1999), pp. 161-81.

[10] The ideologically correct but historically misleading claim that capital sought no state assistance, but only a later right to organize and petition the government (one constitutionally protected in the U.S.) is the way that it disclaims all infrastructural supports, past and present. Lobbying and related forms of influence peddling are acknowledged, but only because they can

claim to be relatively recent, legally and often constitutionally protected, and on their face compatible with the 'free market'.

[11] Weber, *Economy and Society*, Vol. I, Part 1, Chap. 2, 1, 5, 11, 18-21, 24A, 31, 37, 39-41; Chap. 3, 8, 9, 9A, 12A, 19-22; Part 2, Chap. 4, 1-3.

[12] Contemporary neo liberal attempts to return to both voluntarism and private beneficence more than complement its 'not for profit' (e.g. not for loss) movement to transform public bureaus not thought to be amenable to either contracting out or privatization.

[13] Here it is necessary to acknowledge the central role of sociology and the social sciences in the emerging equation, in particular sociology's virtual fixation on the distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' groups over the past century. This fixation reaches its apotheosis in Talcott Parsons' *The Social System* (New York: Macmillan, 1951), where he theorizes this contrast by reference to his well known 'pattern variables' at pp. 58-67 and *passim*. The net result of making this distinction between primary and secondary groups a centrepiece of sociological theory was to effectively ignore the 90-95% of the real world in the middle that *combined* these two forms of relationship. Most important for our purposes here, however, was/is the impact of this fixation on the willingness of social scientists to concern themselves not only with such complicated relationships, but with families, generations and institutions (as opposed to organizations) as well.

[14] See David Noble, *America by Design* (New York: Oxford, 1977); Alfred Chandler, *The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1977); Stuart Adams, *Captains of Consumption* (New York: Viking, 1969). Virtually all of this, as noted earlier, was fully anticipated in the work of Max Weber *op. cit*. and in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Charles Scribners, 1952), concluding sections. Also see Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958) for a theoretical framework and discussion about consumption that the writer finds very persuasive.

[15] See Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent*. Europe's Twentieth Century (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999). Sylvia Ann Hewlett, in *A Lesser Life: the Myth of Women's Liberation in America* (New York: William Morrow, 1986) argues that this tradition is kept alive through left wing political parties and trade unions. It explains why women in particular benefit from the greater commitment to social expenditure and the social sector generally that has characterized Western continental Europe, particularly since the end of World War II.

[16] H.G.J. Aitken, 'Defensive Expansionism: the State and Economic growth in Canada', in W.T. Easterbrook and M.H. Watkins (eds.), *Approaches to Canadian Economic History* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967).

[17] H.T. Wilson, 'Institutional Complementarity and Canadian Identity', *Canadian Review of American Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1997), pp. 175-90.

[18] See David E. Nye and Carl Pedersen (eds.), *Consumption and American Culture* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1991). For a highly instructive case study, see Jonathan Gruber, *The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of Unemployment Insurance* (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994).

[19] Lindblom, *op. cit*. See also references #'s 3 and 10, this study.

[20] I discuss this in *Capitalism after Postmodernism*, specifying 3 'fictions' (the alleged causes of the so-called 'public' debt; the assumed benefits of 'privatization'; and the illusion of 'free trade'), underwritten by the twin mantras of 'globalization' and the 'new competitiveness'. In effect, this system of thinking constitutes nothing less than our new, and increasingly dominant, form of public religion, not only in the developed West and North, but in emerging states with a strong developmental agenda like Turkey.

[21] H.T. Wilson, *Retreat from Governance*. Canada and the Continental-International Challenge (Hull: Voyageur, 1989); and Wilson, *Bureaucratic Representation* for analysis of the situation in Canada and the U.S. respectively.

[22] Herschel Hardin, *The Privatization Putsch* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1989).

[23] Mazower, *op. cit*. See reference # 15, this study.

[24] Bernard Connolly, *The Rotten Heart of Europe*. The Dirty War for Europe's Money (London: Faber and Faber, 1995); H.T. Wilson, 'The Challenge to Participatory Democracy in an Emerging Supranational Europe', *The European Legacy*, vol. 3, No. 4 (July, 1998), pp. 86-95.

[25] See Oded Stark, *Altruism and Beyond*. An Economic Analysis of Transfers and Exchanges within Families and Groups (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[26] Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959).

[27] Wilson, *Capitalism after Postmodernism*, was written largely in response to Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975) and 'Technology and Science as Ideology', in Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society* (London: Heinemann, 1971). It argued, against Habermas, that the presence of modern bases for claims to legitimacy did not mean that capital had forsaken traditional techniques of legitimation like those discussed by Weber in *Economy and Society*, Vol. I, Chap.1, 5-7 and Chap. 3 (entire); far from it. Discussed in Wilson, *Capitalism after Postmodernism*, chapters 1,2 and 11 and *passim*.

[28] If ever there was a time when one could say of implementation (e.g. execution, administration, application, enforcement) that it confirmed Murray Edelman's claim in *The Symbolic Uses of*

Politics (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1964) that it constitutes the key to understanding democratic government, it is today.

[29] Robert Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, revised and enlarged edition (New York: Free Press/Macmillan, 1957), pp. 19-84.

[30] H.T. Wilson, *Tradition and Innovation*. The Idea of Civilization as Culture and its Significance (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 145-208, especially sections addressing Weber's distinction between bureaucratization occuring through the routinization of charisma and bureaucratization occuring through the process of legal rationalization, discussed by Weber in *Economy and Society*, Vol. I, Book 1, Chapter 3.

[31] Wilson, *Bureaucratic Representation*, particularly chapters 2, 3, 7 and 8. Weber himself contributed significantly to the rigid and inflexible distinction between policy and administration, one which presupposes that the distinction between policy formulation and policy implementation is itself meaningful. However, it is really only in the U.S. that it becomes the ideological centrepiece of a public religion of representative democracy. See Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State* (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), text and references for the background to this development

[32] See Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy*. Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

[33] H.T. Wilson, *Political Management*. Redefining the Public Sphere (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984).

[34] Ernest Barker, 'Burke and his Bristol Constituency', in Barker, *Essays on Government* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945). On Rousseau's concept of democracy and his attitude toward representation, see Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 22-25 and *supra*, index references. More generally, see Norton Long, *op. cit*. for an approach to public policy that addresses the problem of representation.

[35] A strong argument can be made against Parsons, *op. cit*. that many to most collective activities that people carry out in capitalist democratic societies combine the primary and secondary orientations he discusses. They therefore sit somewhere midway between the role diffuseness of the family or friendship group and the role specificity of the work situation viewed, usually inappropriately save for its beginnings, as a 'society of strangers'. Anyone who has done political and/or party work, particularly as a citizen rather than as an employee, can bear this out. See reference no. 13, this study.

[36] Wilson, *Bureaucratic Representation*, especially chapters 4 and 5. In the writer's opinion, direct democracy is best restricted to the process of formally amending or modifying constitutional, basic law or founding documents. Representative democracy is usually superior

for larger and more complex democratic collectives precisely because of the element of delay that often-to-regularly allows issues which a direct democratic approach might treat serially to gel into some sort of configuration. See generally Sartori, *op. cit*. and Wilson, *Political Management*, chapter 5. For this to happen, however, other institutions must be present, something I discuss further on in this paper.

[37] By general interests I do not mean Rousseau's rather different notion of the 'general will'. My sense in *Bureaucratic Representation*, *Political Management* and elsewhere would be closest to John Dewey, in *The Public and its Problems* (Denver: Allan Swallow, 1954, 1927) and Walter Lippmann in *The Public Philosophy* (New York: Mentor/New American Library, 1956).

[38] Thus it is not any longer 'negative voting' against the party in power, no matter what that party is, that is the major problem. It is rather the combination of hostility to both public and social sectors, based on their alleged responsibility for the 'public debt', and support for *anti- political and anti-governmental parties* that accounts for majority voting patterns. These latter argue that the problem-solution matrix is simple, thus that there is essentially one economics lesson and one text. See references no. 20 and 27, this study.

[39] This provides a possible insight into why neo liberal parties and governments, quite apart from any alleged savings through cost reductions, or even opportunities for the private sector through contracting out and privatization, are so intent on 're-engineering' and 'reprioritizing' elementary and secondary public education. On the other hand, this could, as in the case of 'downsizing' and its impact on the representation of poor, weak and marginal elements of the population, be an unintended outcome of the process.

[40] Merton, *op. cit*. pp. 19-84 generally and pp. 51, 61-2, 66, 128, 563, 597.

[41] Wilson, *Bureaucratic Representation.*

[42] Lindblom, *op. cit*.; Teeple, *op. cit*.; Stewart, *op. cit*.; Shields and Evans, *op. cit*.

[43] See Robert Kuttner, *The Economic Illusion*. False Choices between Prosperity and Social Justice (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984).

[44] Edelman's analysis at *op. cit*. thus may need to be supplemented by the realization that an already limited (and necessarily so) willingness to enforce statutes, ordinances and rules and regulations in capitalist democratic societies, for fear of 'losing the baby with the bath water' has turned into a 'game' that is even less well distributed than it was when he wrote about it in the U.S. in 1964.

[45] Merton, *op. cit*. pp. 19-84.

[46] See: Council of Europe, Secretariat General, *Disillusionment with Democracy*. Participation and Non-participation in Democratic Institutions (Colchester, Essex: Human Rights Centre, 1993); Loek Halman and Neil Nevitte (eds.), *Political Value Change in Western Democracies*. Integration, Values, Identification and Participation (Tilburg, Netherlands: Tilburg University Press, 1996); and the seminal study by Lester W. Milbraith, *Political Participation*. How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics, all editions (Washington, D.C.: University Press of the Americas, 1965, 1977, 1982).

[47] Lindblom, *op. cit*.; David Lewis, *Louder Voices: Corporate Welfare Bums* (Toronto: James Lewis and Samuel, 1972); Lawrence Kallen, *Corporate Welfare*. The Mega Bankruptcies of the 80's and 90's (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1991); Hardin, *Privatization Putsch*; and Kim McQuaid, *Uneasy Partners: Big Business in American Politics, 1945-1990* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994)

[48] H.T. Wilson, *Retreat from Governance*. Canada and the Continental-International Challenge (Hull: Voyageur, 1989); Wilson, *Capitalism after Postmodernism*. On the 'theft' of infrastructural resources and values from the public and social sectors in order to increase superficial technical progress in the production of commodities and the purchasing power it helps sustain for the well-to-do, see Frank Levy, *The New Dollars and Dreams: Americans Incomes and Economic Change* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), but especially Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1998-99* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

[49] More to the point, it would appear that an initial absence of the intention to secure this result has now given way to a more goal-directed pursuit of this outcome in the light of subsequent experience demonstrating a cause and effect relationship between the two. Thus the very perception of a given unintended consequence, if desirable, thereafter makes it a manifest, if covert, goal of (neo-liberal) public policy.

[50] Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society*, 2nd edition, translated by George Simpson (New York: Free Press/Macmillan, 1952, originally published in French in 1893, 2nd edition, 1902), pp. 66-7, 125 and *supra*, index references to Spencer.

[51] Claus Offe, 'Competitive Party Democracy and the Keynesian Welfare State: Factors of Stability and Disorganization', *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 15, No.3 (1983), pp. 225-46. More generally, Offe, *Contradictions of the Welfare State*, translated by John Keane (London: Hutchinson, 1984) and *Disorganized Capitalism*, translated by John Keane (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).