Max Weber’s ‘Four-Stage Rationalization-Scale of Social Action and Order’ in the ‘Categories’ and its Significance to the ‘Old Manuscript’ of his ‘Economy and Society’: A Positive Critique of Wolfgang Schluchter

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Abstract

The basic concepts laid out in Weber’s 1913 essay: ‘Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology’ constitute ‘the four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order’. The first stage—the germinal similar action of plural individuals (gleichartiges Massenhandeln); the second—the orderless social action among plural individuals (amorphes Gemeinschaftshandeln); the third—the social action among plural individuals oriented one another to the non-enacted order (Einverständnishandeln); the fourth—the social action among plural individuals oriented one another to the rationally enacted order (Gesellschaftshandeln). This article aims to show that this scale, unique to the ‘Categories’, is not only an outcome of Weber’s critic of Rudolf Stammler, but also is validly applied throughout the whole ‘Old Manuscript’ of the ‘Economy and Society’.

Keywords: Max Weber, Interpretive sociology, Economy and Society (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft), social action, social order, rationalization, community and association, domination, consensus and enactment.

Problem

Max Weber’s sociological main work known as ‘Economy and Society’ (from the first to the fifth versions) was edited and published as ‘One Book with Two Parts’. But this composition unwarrantably combined Weber’s two divergent manuscripts written respectively in different periods into ‘One Book’. Weber wrote the ‘Old Manuscript’ (hereafter OM) probably from 1910 until the outbreak of World War I in August 1914. After the War, he set about a radical

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revision of the OM and partially finished the ‘New Manuscript’ (hereafter NM) just before his death in June 1920. The editors, Marianne Weber and Johannes Winckelmann, arranged this NM as the ‘First Part’, the OM as the succeeding ‘Second Part’, contrary to the time-order according to which the manuscripts had been written by Max Weber.

This combination of NM and OM in the reversed order brought about serious problems. For example, the basic concepts found in the concrete chapters of the ‘Second Part’ are at variance with those formulated in the opening chapter, entitled ‘Sociological Basic Concepts’, of the ‘First Part’. This variance is natural, as the author changed his basic concepts and terms when he radically revised the OM to the NM. However, as far as the basic concepts are concerned, the changes were to some degree too delicate and subtle to be noticed and to be clearly distinguished (for the main differences formulated see Orihara 2003a: 152-53). The editors, probably being unaware of the variance derived from the revision, compelled the readers to read the concrete chapters of the OM of 1910–1914 with the altered basic concepts and terms of 1920. Their versions were, so to speak, ‘A Torso with a Wrong Head’.

How about the ‘Complete Works’ version then? As Orihara argued in a previous paper contributed to this journal (2003a: 133-68), the five sub-volumes (Gesamtausgabe I/22/1-5) corresponding to the OM must be considered as ‘Five Disjointed Body-Parts without a Head’. Either within the texts per se or even as editors’ supplementary remarks, the sub-volumes (at least the four already published), plainly lack their unified conceptual introduction, with which Weber himself would never have dispensed. Accordingly, the sub-volumes lack a systematic integration resting on basic concepts that spread beyond each sub-volume. At least we cannot perceive such a systematic integration either from the texts or as editors’ expositions.

As is well known, Weber declared his fundamental intention and viewpoint in the ‘Foreword’ to the ‘Outline of Social Economics’ in June 1914, as follows: Assuming every sphere of life to possess its own autonomy, he would like to ‘grasp the development of the economy as a partial phenomenon of the rationalization of life in general’ (Weber 1914: vii). The part allotted to him is entitled ‘Economy and the Social Orders and Powers’. As this title clearly indicates, his OM was destined to focus on the relationship of the economy with the ‘society’, more precisely, the ‘structural forms of human
groups (Gemeinschaften)’ (Weber 1980: 212; 1978: 356; 2001b: 114). If so, the development of these ‘structural forms’ must be as well grasped as another ‘partial phenomenon of the rationalization of life in general’.

In his conceptual introduction to the OM itself, Weber reaffirmed this intention, saying ‘We shall have to trace the growing penetration of the process of rationalization and association into all spheres of social action (Gemeinschaftshandeln) as a most essential dynamic factor in development’ (E&S: 196, 333; emphasis mine).

To carry out this fundamental intention, how could he have done that without a master compass? In other words, what is the scale for which he arranged his basic concepts, in order to measure the degree of that ‘rationalization’? Only if we are well acquainted with this scale that works as a master compass, can we read the OM according to his original intention.

Weber’s basic concepts of ‘Categories’ and his critique of Stammler
Where and how, can we find his basic concepts being defined and arranged for this scale of ‘rationalization’?

On this matter, Wolfgang Schluchter (1991: 628) answered at first that the basic concepts are certainly found in the separately published essay of 1913: ‘Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology’ (hereafter: ‘Categories’). He once recognized that the basic concepts formulated in the ‘Categories’ were applied throughout the whole OM, so that the ‘Categories’ must be put in front of the OM (1991: 633). Moreover, he properly pointed out that Weber had elaborated the basic concepts of the ‘Categories’ in close connection with his critique of Stammler (1907) (Schluchter 1998: 338-39; 1999: 739; 2000: 182-83, 187; 2005: 230, 232, 236-37).

Schluchter seems, however, to have changed or moderated his assertion since his essay in 1998: ‘Max Weber’s Contribution to the “Outline of the Social Economics”’ (Schluchter 1998: 327-43). Asking how Weber’s writing proceeded, he tried to distinguish some divergent ‘working periods’ during which Weber had written the OM. From this point of view, he began to suspect that the basic concepts of the ‘Categories’ had lost their role as the guiding principle to the whole OM in the ‘second period’, that is, from the end of 1912 or the

1. Hereafter, with respect to citations from Economy and Society, abbreviated as E&S, as far as the 5th edition of 1980, the English translation of 1978 are concerned, only page numbers are written, e.g., ‘E&S: 212; 356’.

beginning of 1913 to the middle of 1914. In particular, he presumes that the texts such as ‘Sociology of Religion’, ‘Domination’ and so on, belong to the ‘second period’ and he doubts if the terms ‘consensus and its composites (= the composite words formed with consensus)’ (Einverständniss und seine Komposita), which are unique to the ‘Categories’, are applied to in those ‘second period’ texts.

Moreover, Schluchter’s suspicion seems to be reinforced (Schluchter 2005: 229-38) by the interim findings from the editing of the third sub-volume ‘Law’ (which is the only remaining unpublished sub-volume). Judging from Weber’s handwritten manuscript itself, which is transmitted to the editorial staff, they say that the OM, at least the chapters related to the sub-volume ‘Law’, consists of a number of text-layers or text-groups (Gephart 2003: 111-27).

It is indeed natural that the text, written during the four or five years (1910–1914), should have some layers. In addition, it is very valuable as well to investigate the manuscript itself thoroughly to distinguish the text-layers within it. Nevertheless, to discover such layers is one thing. To find out any conceptual disintegration among them is another. Even if such layers are ascertained to exist by careful comparison, the next step is primarily to ask whether or in what degree the original conceptual integration, so natural as a project, remains or terminates among such different layers. Only when this question is duly answered, the loss of the original integration can be proved. So the previous question still remains: what was the original conceptual integration? If we go forward without answering this ‘sine qua non’, we cannot but ‘drift about in the ocean, without a helm’.

Then, how can we find out such an original conceptual integration?

We can regard the ‘Categories’ as a compact compendium, into which all the fruits of Weber’s intensive methodological thinking since ‘Roscher and Knies’, especially of his critique of Rudolf Stammer, have been compiled and positively reformulated for a foundation of his interpretive sociology to be developed from that time on.2

However, we have no space here to follow comprehensively and intensively the development of his methodological thinking (for

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2. Weber wrote in the opening note, that ‘the second part of his essay should serve as the methodical foundation’ not only of ‘his contribution to a collective work (E&S) shortly to be published’, but also for ‘concrete studies in general’ (Weber 1988b: 427 n.; 1981: 179 n. 1). Hereafter, as for citations from ‘Categories’, only page numbers are written, so ‘Categories: 427 n.; 179 n. 1’.
such a following, see Orihara 2003b). So let us start from a contra-
vention to Schluchter’s view. It should be noted once again, that it
is very much to Schluchter’s credit that he discerned the connection
between the basic concepts of the ‘Categories’ and Weber’s critique
of Stammller. But it seems to me that he has not made the best of his
own insight.

According to Weber (1988b: 368-83), Stammller properly asked
what constitutes the ‘social life’, but he could not give a clear answer
to his own question. Stammller regarded the ‘social life’ as ‘living
together, regulated externally through law’. He once set this defini-
tion correctly against the simple ‘temporal-spatial coexistence of
plural individuals’ (Stammller 1906: 77-111.). But he then confused
the concept with the empirical reality to be conceptualized, so as
to bring the strict dichotomy (that holds true of the concept alone)
between the ‘simple coexistence’ and ‘the social life regulated exter-
nally through law’ into the empirical reality as well. At the same
time, he could not consider the opposition of the non-natural (the
sociocultural) to the natural as that of the ‘meaningful (sinnhaft)’
to the ‘having nothing to do with meaning (sinnfremd)’, as clearly
as Weber formulated for a link of the same critique (Weber 1988b:
331-37; Mukai 2000: 240-56). As a result, Stammller did not come
to recognize the liquid transition in the empirical reality from the
‘temporal-spatial coexistence of plural individuals without meaning-
relationship’ to ‘their living together meaningfully regulated through

Against Stammller, based on this negative critique, Weber himself
conceptualized the very transition, in connection with his mean-
ing (Sinn) theory, as a positive unfolding and formulation of ‘what
Stammller should have meant’ (Categories: 427 n.; 179). Thus, Weber
could outline in the ‘Categories’ a conceptual scheme, a ‘four-stage
rationalization-scale of social action and order’. And he applied it to the
whole OM including the texts that Schluchter presumed to be written
by Weber during the ‘second period’.

Four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order

This scale basically consists of the following four stages (see Catego-
ries: 439-74, 159-79):

3. But he mistook the latter at one time for the ‘absolutely isolated individual’,
at another time for the ‘purely instinctive life’. 
The first germinal stage is the (not-yet-fully-social) similar action of plural individuals (gleichartiges od. gleichmässiges Massenhandeln), when there is still neither meaningful order nor meaning-relationship among themselves. This stage is the precondition for social action. The empirical regularity of action at this stage is called ‘custom (Sitte)’.

The second stage is the orderless social action among plural individuals (amorphes Gemeinschaftshandeln). At this stage there arises some meaning-relationship among them, but without any meaningful order.

The third stage is the social action among plural individuals oriented one another to the non-enacted order (einverständnismässiges Gemeinschaftshandeln). Here, the social action, in this case ‘consensual action (Einverständnishandeln)’, proceeds as if there is some enacted order existing among them, because they regard one another’s expectation as ‘valid (gültig)’ and practically meet it. The non-enacted order that adequately generates in this way some empirical regularity of the social action is called ‘convention (Konvention)’.

The fourth stage is the social action among plural individuals oriented one another to the rationally enacted order (vergesellschaftetes Gemeinschaftshandeln). The enacted order (gesetzte Ordnung), as well as the ‘convention’, adequately causes some empirical regularity of the social action, in this case ‘associational action (Gesellschaftshandeln)’.

‘Law (Recht)’ is a special case of the enacted order, the empirical validity of which is guaranteed also externally by the ‘coercive apparatus (Zwangsapparat)’.

At the first stage, the simple coexistence of plural individuals, the collectivity of those who commonly share some specific mark or distinctive situation, is later called ‘Gruppe’, namely ‘statistical group’ in English. It is merely a germinal precondition for ‘group-formation (Vergemeinschaftung)’. As soon as any meaning-relationship springs up among those individuals, it proceeds to a real ‘group (Gemeinschaft)’.

The collectivities at the second, third and fourth stages are ‘amorphous, consensual, and associational groups (Gemeinschaften)’. Only the last one, ‘vergesellschaftete Gemeinschaft’, is called ‘Gesellschaft’.

In addition, as for the groups that grow to be perennial, Weber introduced a distinction between ‘institution (Anstalt)’ and ‘organization (Verband)’ from the viewpoint of how their members are recruited. The ‘institution’ is defined as an ‘associational group’ with its enacted order and coercive apparatus for enforcing the order.
But the membership or participation is ‘ascribed on the basis of purely objective facts independent of declarations by those persons ascribed’ (Categories: 466; 174), as is the case with ‘state’ or ‘church’ in the technical sense. In this respect, the ‘institution’ is contrasted to the ‘voluntary association (Zweckverein)’, the rational ideal type of ‘association’, where the enacted order is not ‘imposed (oktroyiert)’ from above by some superior authority, but ‘agreed (paktiert, ver-einbart)’ in principle by all the participants or members to be.

Different from them, the ‘organization’ is a ‘consensual group’ that lacks formally enacted order and coercive apparatus. But certain power holders ‘issue consensually effective rules for the action of those consensually counted participants’ and exert, if necessary, ‘physical or psychic coercion against those participants who violate the consensus’ (Categories: 466; 174).

The transition from the first to the fourth stage is not only liquid, but also reversible or bilateral. For instance, although the transition from consensual to associational action is naturally fluid, ‘nearly every association tends to give rise to a consensual action among its associates that transcends the realm of the association’s rational purposes (consensual action “conditioned by association”)’ as well. So, ‘every bowling club has “conventional” consequences for the behavior of members to one another, i.e., it brings about social action oriented to “consensus” outside the association’ (Categories: 461; 171).

On the whole, however, the observable historical development indicates ‘an ever wider ranging rational ordering of consensual action by means of statute [enacted rule] and, especially, an increasing incidence of transformation of organizations (Verbände) into rationally ordered institutions (Anstalten)’ (Categories: 471; 177). So the calculability of others’ actions grows on average with the stages, the series of which can be qualified accordingly as a ‘rationalization-scale’.

Here, we must pay attention to this peculiar terminology of Max Weber and that only of his ‘Categories’, where ‘Gemeinschaft’, in this case ‘group in general formed by social actions’, is not the opposite of, but superior to ‘Gesellschaft’. Gesellschaft is a special case of Gemeinschaft in so far as the enacted order exists and empirically holds good. Gesellschaft, therefore, necessarily is Gemeinschaft at any time.

If anyone should confuse this terminology unique to Weber’s ‘Categories’ of 1913 with that of Ferdinand Tönnies or of Weber’s
own in ‘the Basic Sociological Concepts’ of 1920, the expression ‘association-formation to a community (Vergesellschaftung zu einer ...Gemeinschaft)’, for instance, does not make sense. In reality, however, such remarkable expressions are often found throughout the OM. They designate the typical situation where some specific consensual group (Gemeinschaft) is generated through the medium of association-formation (Vergesellschaftung). For example, Weber discusses the ‘local community or congregation (Gemeinde)’ as such a ‘consensual group conditioned by association-formation’, and this in several separate places of some different chapters of the OM. So, in this case, it is not until we rely on the peculiar terminology above for a guide, that we can grasp the inner connection and integration of the seemingly unrelated, scattered passages, as discussed below in greater detail.

In ‘Categories’, Weber did not contrive a few basic concepts apart from one another, but properly arranged them solely for the ‘four-stage rationalization-scale’. Hence, the terms ‘consensus and its composites’ must be treated solely as a link in the chain, designating the third stage of that scale.

Now, we can find the ‘four-stage rationalization-scale’ being applied throughout the OM no matter when the text was written. As we demonstrate in the following: (1) the terms ‘consensus and its composites’ have been applied by Weber himself, as the distinctive mark of the third stage, even in the text of ‘Domination’ that is presumed by Schluchter to belong to the ‘second period’; (2) even if the terms ‘consensus and its composites’ are not found, the ‘four-stage rationalization-scale’ itself with its basic concepts (for example, ‘Vergesellschaftung zu einer... Gemeinschaft’, ‘übergreifende Ver-gemeinschaftung’ etc.) is certainly applied by Weber also in the ‘second period’. Namely, it is utilized as valid everywhere in the whole OM.

_Weber's sociological concept of domination in ‘Categories’ and OM_

According to Max Weber’s own comment on the construction of the OM (E&S: 356; 2001b: 114) and his ‘disposition of 1914’ (1914: x-xi; cited in Orihara 2003a: 165-66), the whole OM was to be divided into three parts. The first is a conceptual introduction which corresponds to the item 1 of the ‘disposition of 1914’. The second is a general characterization of certain universal types of groups (the items 2-7). The third is the rather detailed discussion about the historically
developed forms of those groups in connection with ‘domination’ (the item 8). Of these three parts, Weber has attached great importance to the phenomenon ‘domination’.

Well, it is just in the ‘Categories’ that Weber first arrived at his sociological concept of domination. Since he had been armed with his meaning theory introduced into the definition of the ‘social life’ at his critique of Stammler, he was freed from the ordinary path of taking domination like a physical phenomenon where the stronger mechanically overwhelms the weaker. He, instead, grasped domination as indeed a non-symmetric, but meaningful social relationship between the ruler with some authority of command, on the one hand, and the ruled with a corresponding obligation of obedience, on the other. Moreover, in connection with his ‘four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order’, he could pay attention to, and focus on, the ‘legitimacy consensus (Legitimitäts-Einverständnis)’, with which the former legitimates his rule as well as the latter accept it and are motivated to obey.

In the ‘Categories’ already, with this basic conception in his mind, Weber appropriately observed the ‘meaningful bases of that legitimacy consensus’ to determine ‘in fundamentally significant fashion the specific character of domination wherever naked fear or directly threatening power does not condition the submissiveness’ (Categories: 470; 177). Weber then, in the third part of the OM, designates the simple generic concept (Gattungsbegriff) of ‘domination by authority’ alike, and elaborates the three quasi-generic ideal types (gattungsmässige Idealtypen): ‘rational’, ‘traditional’ and ‘charismatic’, according to each one’s distinctive basis of the ‘legitimacy consensus’.

In the opening chapter of the OM on ‘Domination’, he starts by putting emphasis on the universal significance of domination in general, as follows:

Domination in the most general sense is one of the most important elements of social action (Gemeinschaftshandeln)… Without exception every sphere of social action is profoundly influenced by structures of dominancy. In a great number of cases the emergence of rational association (rationale Vergesellschaftung) from amorphous social action (amorphes Gemeinschaftshandeln) has been due to domination and the way in which it has been exercised. Even where this is not the case, the structure of dominancy and its unfolding is decisive in determining the form of social action and its orientation toward a ‘goal’ (E&S: 541, 941; 2005: 126-27; partial emphasis mine).
This last sentence can be seen as referring to the case where the ruler compels the ruled to accept the ‘goal’ as ‘valid’ and to take *consensual* action toward it, even if the former can not impose an *enacted* order on the latter. Thus, the significance of domination in general is elucidated, so to speak, as a *lever to rationalization*, based on the ‘four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order’ of the ‘Categories’.

As for its *rational ideal type* ‘bureaucracy’, the same can be said even more clearly. ‘Bureaucracy is the means of transforming social action (“Gemeinschaftshandeln”) into rationally organized [associational] action (rational geordnetes “Gesellschaftshandeln”)... Under otherwise equal conditions, rationally organized and directed action (Gesellschaftshandeln) is superior to every kind of collective behavior (Massenhandeln) and also [amorphous or consensual] social action (Gemeinschaftshandeln) opposing it’ (E&S: 569-70, 987; 2005: 208; partial emphasis mine).

Without being fully informed of the ‘four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order’ of the ‘Categories’, we could not understand what these passages mean and imply precisely.

*‘Consensus and its composites’ applied in ‘Traditional Domination’*

Furthermore, in his discussion on the second quasi-generic ideal type ‘Traditional Domination’, Weber *explicitly* applies his specific terms ‘consensus and its composites’ three times.

First, he calls the social relationship between the ruler and the ruled in the ‘patrimonial state (patrimonialstaatliches Gebilde)’, plainly ‘*consensual*’ as follows:

As a rule, the political patrimonial ruler is linked with the ruled through a *consensual community* (Einverständnigemeinschaft) which also exists apart from his independent military force and which is rooted in the belief that the ruler’s powers are legitimate insofar as they are traditional (E&S: 590, 1020; 2005: 274; emphasis mine).

The ‘patrimonial state’ means the political organization, where a powerful patriarch ruled not only his own ‘oikos’, but also the other ‘oikoi’ (pl.) politically with physical coercive force and treated the ruled alike as ‘patrimonial dependents’. Yet in such a political organization too, except for the extreme form of ‘Sultanism’, the politically ruled were ordinarily attached to the political ruler through the legitimacy *consensus*. Namely, the former *consented* to the latter’s exercise of power as ‘valid’, so long as it fell within the range of tradition in each case.
Secondly, Weber writes as follows:

The alienation of the fief, which of course required the lord’s willingness to accept the new vassal, became more and more the rule and the purchase of his consent (Einverständnis) one of the most important feudal sources of revenue. However, the purchase was equivalent to the full appropriation of the fief, since the transfer fee came to be fixed by tradition or law (traditionell oder durch Satzung) (E&S: 635, 1084; 2005: 408-409; emphasis mine).

The ‘fief-relationship (Lehensverhältnis)’ linked the ‘lord’, the ruler, to the ‘vassals’, the ruled, who, in this case, constituted ‘administrative staffs (Verwaltungsstäbe)’ to assist the ruler. The lord bestowed a fief (a tract of land and the power to control it) personally on the vassal, at first in exchange for homage and military service from the latter.

Now, the traditional domination in general gives rise to struggles for power, which are, openly and covertly, carried on between the ruler and the administrative staffs, and bring about shifts in the power relationship. A precarious power balance comes into existence, somewhere between the decentralizing tendency for the latter fully to appropriate the control over the fiefs invested to themselves and the centralizing counteraction by the former to expropriate the control once appropriated by the latter.

The ‘feudalism’ or fief-relationship is a form where the decentralizing trend surpasses the centralizing one. There, the appropriation by the vassals goes practically so far that they can alienate their fief. At first, it is necessary to obtain the lord’s agreement to approve the alienation concerned as ‘valid’ and to accept the new holder of the fief as his succeeding vassal, even if there were no enacted order for him to do so. But, in course of time, that consensus itself also comes to be purchased as to be the lord’s main source of revenue. Moreover, the transfer fee is first fixed by tradition, later stipulated by enacted rule. To that extent, the alienation of the fief becomes a calculable transaction.

Thus, in the passage above, Weber’s ‘four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order’ is explicitly applied to the fief-relationship and that including the terms ‘consensus’ and ‘enacted rule or order’.

Thirdly, Weber explicates the condition, in which the ‘Ständestaat’ has been formed, as follows:

Once the fiefholders constituted an autonomous legal group, the Ständestaat came into being for very diverse reasons, mainly however because the stereotyped and therefore inflexible fiefs and privileges
had to be adapted to extraordinary or new administrative requirements [for example, an enormous expenditure on armaments and wars]... There were no provisions for raising these special revenues; hence the frequent conclusion of new agreements was unavoidable, eventually requiring a consociation (Vergesellschaftung) of the individual power-holders in the form of a corporative assembly. This very association (Vergesell-schaftung) either included the prince or turned privileged persons into ‘Estate’, and thus changed the mere agreed-upon action (blosses Einverständnishandeln) of the various power-holders and the temporary associations (Vergesellschaftungen von Fall zu Fall) into a permanent political structure (ein perennierendes politisches Gebilde) (E&S: 637, 1086-87; 2005: 411-12; partial emphasis mine).

This passage looks just like a parade of the basic concepts constituting the ‘four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order’. It is not until we rely on this scale, that we can analyze the process and the condition, in which the ‘Ständestaat’ emerged. Simultaneously, we can position it on the boundary of the traditional domination, from which the patrimonial bureaucracy of the absolutist kingdom gradually revolves into the rational one of the modern state.

Textual connection between ‘Charismatic Domination’ and ‘Categories’

As for the chapter on ‘Charismatic Domination’, the third quasi-generic ideal type of the legitimate domination, it is true that Weber does not explicitly apply there the terms ‘consensus and its composites’. But, by means of a cross-reference, that chapter is plainly attached to the basic concepts of ‘Categories’.

In that chapter, Weber contrasts charisma to rationalization in so far as both operate as revolutionary power. The former revolutionizes its followers ‘from the inside’ and ‘shapes material and social conditions according to its revolutionary will’. Against it, the latter revolutionizes ‘from the outside’, namely, it ‘first changes the material and social orders, and through them the people, by changing the conditions of adaptation’ (E&S: 657, 1116; 2005: 481). Here, Weber stresses the point that the difference between the two types of revolution does not lie in the original ideas intuitively conceived by the charismatic or bureaucratic ruler or leader alike, but in the manner in which the ruled and led experience and internalize the ideas. In this respect, he instructs the reader to refer backward, as follows:

As we have shown earlier, rationalization proceeds in such a fashion that the broad masses of the led merely accept or adapt themselves to the external, technical, resultants which are of practical significance for their interests (as we ‘learn’ the multiplication table and as too many
jurists ‘learn’ the techniques of law), whereas the substance of the creator’s ideas remain irrelevant to them (E&S: 658, 1116-17; 2005: 482; partial emphasis mine).

Now, this thesis on the concomitant result of the rationalization in general is discussed nowhere within the OM, but at the end of the ‘Categories’ (Categories: 471-74, 177-79). Here, Weber asks, what it practically means that the order of a group is rationalized. He then answers that the masses, adapted to rationally enacted orders as well as to rationally produced daily goods, are increasingly alienated from the rational bases (ideas or principles) on which the orders or the goods have been created. They merely believe them to function in a rational calculable way.

Thus, Weber’s instruction in the OM to refer backward corresponds in content exactly to this description in the ‘Categories’ abbreviated here.

**Concept of ‘Gemeinde’ in ‘OM’**

Next, how about the chapter on ‘Sociology of Religion’ that Schuchter presumed to be written by Weber in the ‘second period’ as well. It is true that the terms ‘consensus and its composites’ cannot be found there. But, with respect to the ‘congregation (Gemeinde)’, the main theme of the religious group-formation, the concept of the ‘association-formation (Vergesellschaftung)’ is consistently applied in the sense unique to the ‘Categories’, especially as a constituent of the remarkable expression ‘Vergesellschaftung zu einer… Gemeinschaft’.

According to Weber, there are several cases, in which the congregation, the Gemeinde in the religious sense, comes into existence. In one case, it results from the routinization of prophecy. The personal disciples or helpers of a prophet, the administrative staff of the charismatic ruler, do not want to leave the adherents, whom the prophet gathers around himself, as they remain ‘temporary laymen (Gelegenheitslaien)’, namely an amorphous group (amorphe Gemeinschaft). Instead, they fix the rules, through which both sides come to be organized into a congregation with enacted rights and duties. The association-formation (Vergesellschaftung) by the staff gives birth to a religious congregation (Gemeinde) as a consensual group (Einverständnissgemeinschaft) on the basis of plural neighborhoods. In other words, a consensual group is born, in this way ‘conditioned by association-formation’ (E&S: 275-76, 452-53; 2001a: 194-95; emphasis and additions mine).
In another case, Gemeinde is organized and utilized by an imperial conqueror as a means for the domestication of the conquered masses. The previous political organization of the conquered is exterminated and the inhabitants are disarmed, but their priests are guaranteed to remain in their position and to govern their congregation even with some political competence. Here Weber adds, ‘This was done because the religious congregation was regarded as a valuable instrument for pacifying the conquered, just as the neighborhood association turned into a compulsory community (die Zwangsgemeinde aus dem Nachbarschafts-verband) was found to be useful for the protection of financial interests (zur Sicherung fiskalischer Interessen)’ (E&S: 277, 454-55; 2001a: 197-98; emphasis mine).

The concept ‘Gemeinde’, therefore, is not only applied in the religious sense to various cases of religious congregation. With respect to its first case stated above, Weber adds:

A congregation in the specifically religious sense (for this term is [in German] also employed to denote the neighborhood that has been associated for economic or for fiscal or other political purposes) does not arise solely in connection with prophecy in the particular sense used here (E&S: 275, 452; 2001a: 195).

The German original text runs here as follows:

Die ‘Gemeinde’ in diesem religiösen Sinn—die zweite Kategorie von Gemeinde, neben dem aus ökonomischen, fiskalischen oder anderen politischen Gründen vergesellschafteten Nachbaverschaftsverband—taucht ebenfalls nicht nur bei Prophetie im hier festgehaltenen Sinne auf.

Then, what is the first category of the ‘Gemeinde’? With regard to this, Weber writes in another chapter on ‘Neighborhood’ as follows:

The neighborhood is the natural (urwüchsig) basis of the local community (Gemeinde)—a structure which arises only, as we shall see later [cf. ch. XVI, ‘The City’], by virtue of political action comprising a multitude of neighborhoods (E&S: 217, 363; 2001b: 125; emphasis mine).

Here, the English translator regards this author’s reference forward as indicating ‘the city as an autonomous local community (die Stadt als eine Gemeinde)’ in Weber’s particular sense, discussed in the later chapter on ‘City’. But, why does it deserve the first category? Should it rather be the third? If so, what is the first then? Where is it described?

In this respect, the following two passages are worth noting. One is from the chapter called ‘Sociology of Law’, as follows:
The [English] king assured himself of the contributions needed for the government and the administration of justice by forming compulsory organizations with collective duties (Zwangsverbände mit Kollektivpflichten) similar to those of the Chinese, the Hellenistic, the late Roman, the Russian, or other legal systems. A communalite (Gemeinde) existed exclusively as an organization with liturgical duties toward the royal administration, and it had its rights only by virtue of royal grant or indulgence (E&S: 435; 723; emphasis mine).

The other is from the chapter on ‘Patriarchal and Patrimonial Domination’, as follows:

The liturgical meeting of the ruler’s political and economic needs is most highly developed in the patrimonial state. This mode of meeting demands has different forms and effects. We are here interested in those consociations of the subjects (Vergesellschaftungen der Untertanen) which derive from liturgical methods. For the ruler, liturgical methods mean that he secures the fulfillment of obligations through the creation of heteronomous and often heterocephalous associations (heteronome und oft heterokephale Verbände) held accountable for them. Just as the kinship group is answerable for crimes of its members, so these associations are liable for the obligations of all members.

Liturgical methods of meeting public needs prevailed especially in the Orient: in Egypt and in parts of the Hellenistic world, and again in the late Roman and the Byzantine Empire. With less consistency these methods were also applied in the Occident and played a considerable role, for example, in English administrative history (E&S: 592, 1022-23; 2005: 278-81; emphasis mine).

Thus, we can consider the first category of ‘Gemeinde’ to be such a liturgical association of the political subjects with some fixed collective duty and liability that the patrimonial ruler creates for meeting his public wants. He imposes his enacted order on the plural neighborhoods ruled by him politically, and, by means of this association-formation (Vergesellschaftung) from above, organizes these natural bases into a consensual group (Einverständnis-gemeinschaft).

After defining this simple generic concept of the ‘Gemeinde’, Weber elaborates, here as well, the two quasi-generic ideal types of its alternative development (E&S: 593-94, 1024-25; 2005: 283-84). The one is the direction that the Gemeinde exceptionally develops toward ‘local administration by largely independent honoratiores’ as in England. The other is that toward ‘a [universal] personal patrimonial dependence of all subjects’ as in the Orient.

Now, on the other hand, if an urban ruler politically comprises the plural urban neighborhoods likewise as natural bases, and associates
them through imposing his enacted order into an local organization, then an ‘urban community structured as a Gemeinde’ will come into existence. With regard to this, Weber writes in the chapter on ‘City’ as follows:

It is quite true that the initiator of the urban economic policy may be a prince (Fürst) in whose political territory the city and its inhabitants belong. In this case, whenever a specifically urban economic policy exists at all, it is determined for the city and its inhabitants and not by it. However, this does not have to be the case, and even if it is, the city must still to some extent be a partially autonomous organization (autonomer Verband), a ‘community’ (Gemeinde) with special administrative and political institutions (mit besonderen politischen und Verwaltungseinrichtungen) (E&S: 732, 1220; 1999: 72).

Therefore, the originally heteronomous urban community, whose enacted order is imposed from above by the urban prince, can grow to be an autonomous, in most cases also autocephalous, organization or institution with its own political and administrative orders. These orders are now enacted through the agreement of its members, the urban inhabitants themselves united with one another to the citizenry (Bürgerstand). So, this fully developed urban community also remains a special case of Gemeinde, ‘a consensual group or organization generated through the medium of certain association-formation among plural neighborhoods as its natural bases’. The resulting organization or institution is, on the whole, autonomous and autocephalous, namely its enacted order and its head or chief do not derive from the imposition by the outside ruler, but from the agreement among the urban inhabitants themselves.

Thus, although the descriptions of the three categories of Gemeinde lie scattered all over the OM and seem to be irrelevant to one another, they are really connected and integrated with the basic concepts unique to the ‘Categories’. They hold in common the general concept, the perennial ‘local community (Gemeinschaft) formed on the natural basis of plural neighborhoods through the medium of (heteronomous or autonomous) association-formation (Vergesellschaftung). Based on this general concept, concrete aspects and developments of such local groups as “religious congregation”, “rural and urban communities” are analyzed and conceptualized under Weber’s central problem,4

4. This problem was finally formulated at the beginning of his ‘Collected Works of the Sociology of Religion’ (see Weber 1988a: 1). But it had already been conceived and also partially stated in the OM. See, e.g., E&S: 229, 379-80; 2001b: 151-52.
“what the peculiar constellation of factors is, that differentiates the
historical destiny of the Occident from the others”.

Consensual group conditioned by association-formation

Now, how about the other chapters that belong to the ‘second
period’? From the chapter on ‘Economic Relationships of Organized
Group’ corresponding to the item 1 (2) of the ‘Disposition of 1914’,
presumed by Schluchter to be written in the ‘second period’, we can
cite the following passage.

_We have already stated in general terms_ that voluntary organizations tend
to transcend their rational primary purpose and create relationships
among the participants that may have quite different goals: As a rule,
an overarching communal relationship (übergreifende Vergemein-
schaftung) attaches itself to the association (Vergesellschaftung) (E&S:
205, 346; 2001b: 91; emphasis mine).

The voluntary association (Zweckverein) that is formed on the
basis of fixed and _enacted_ agreement, such as a religious sect (in
the technical sense), a social club, or even a bowling club, except
for the purely economic or political type, used to _examine_ the appli-
cants’ qualifications. Then, the items to be examined usually extend,
beyond the realm of the specific ability or qualification indispensable
to attaining the definite purpose of the association-formation, up to
the applicants’ ‘conduct’ and ‘personal character’ in general. Accord-
ingly, those who pass such an examination and obtain admission to
it can also be legitimated as its fully-fledged members of respectabil-
ity too. As such, they win and enjoy the confidence of outsiders so
much that they can create and also expand trade relations on credit.
In addition, they can foster various kinds of informal ‘connections’
to afford one another convenience.

As far as these internal and external ‘human relations’ develop
beyond the realm of the rationally enacted order based on the ratio-
nally agreed purpose of the voluntary association, they themselves
are not associational but _consensual_. The associates there regard one
another’s expectations practically as _valid_, and meet them in most
cases. Then, it comes to be widely noticed that such consensual rela-
tionships bring about economic returns. So, often too many appli-
cants appear one after another, who are not interested at all in the
specific purpose of the association-formation, but want to enter it
merely for such benefits. Consequently, the priority of the social rela-
tionship in the very association really shifts from the associational to
the consensual. With this reversal transition, the original purpose of the association-formation often comes to be slighted and even abandoned.

In reality, this thesis is closely related to Weber’s experience during his travels in the United States of America. He observed there the Baptist sects and their secularized equivalents, the clubs, and attained an insight into their latent social and economic functions. Now, in connection with the bilateral ‘four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order’, he recaptures these functions as the consensual relationships derived from the ‘association-formation (Vergesellschaftung)’ and formulates them into an ‘general empirical law’.

Indeed, he does not apply here his terms ‘consensus and its composites’ themselves. But it is quite obvious also from the backward-reference at the beginning of the citation above, that Weber’s conception and formulation is based on the ‘four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order’ of the ‘Categories’. The creation of ‘an overarching communal relationship (übergreifende Verge- meinschaftung)’ as a concomitant result of the ‘association-formation (Vergesellschaftung)’ is already, in the passage of the ‘Categories’ cited previously, literally ‘stated in general terms’, including the illustration of a bowling club.

**Political association reinterpreted to ethnic relationship**

Moreover, Weber also refers to this ‘general empirical law’ in the chapter on ‘Ethnicity’, as follows:

In our sense ethnic membership [Gemeinsamkeit] does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation [Vergemeinschaftung] of any kind, particularly in the political sphere. On the other hand, it is primarily the political community [Gemeinschaft], no matter how artificially organized, which inspires the belief in common ethnicity. This belief tends to persist even after the disintegration of the political community, unless drastic differences in the custom, physical type, or, above all, language exist among its members.

This artificial origin of the belief in common ethnicity follows the previously described pattern (cf. chapter II: 3) of rational association turning into personal relationships. If rationally regulated action is not widespread, almost any association, even the most rational one, creates an overarching communal consciousness; this takes the form of a brotherhood on the basis of the belief in common ethnicity (E&S: 237, 389; 2001b: 175; emphasis mine).
The twelve tribes of Israel were really the administrative subdivisions of a political association, which the kingdom artificially created through a rational association-formation in order to assign the liturgical duty to such subdivisions. But, in those days, such a rationally objectified associational action was not so widespread as to suit the habit of the political subjects. Hence the fictitious brotherhood, that consented to offer monthly meals to the king’s table, was created on the basis of the belief in common ethnicity. It is not until the establishment of this ‘overarching communal consciousness (übergreifendes Gemeinschaftsbewusst-sein), that the rational association-formation infiltrated into people’s minds, obtained their consensus and thus came to fulfil its administrative function smoothly.

Therefore, Weber’s instruction to refer backward, ‘previously described pattern...of rational association turning into personal relationships’, finds its instructed description in the passage cited above. That ‘general scheme well-known to us’ there is applied here to the ethnical group-formation. The general scheme itself is connected through the cross-reference network to the general formulation of the fluid and reversible transition on the ‘four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order’ of the ‘Categories’ (Categories: 460-61, 171).

Working period or object applied?

Well then, how about the remaining other chapters? Indeed, from the chapter on ‘Household’ to that on ‘Oikos’, the terms ‘consensus and its composites’ themselves do not appear explicitly. But it is quite evident that such groups as ‘household’, ‘neighborhood’ and ‘kinship’ do not consist of amorphous social actions that emerge sporadically, but rather of ‘consensual actions’ oriented one another to the non-enacted orders. In these cases, the chances of consensus are related to ‘common household and piety’, ‘neighboring habituation and mutual help in need’, and ‘exogamy, succession to property and joint responsibility for security’ and so on. Such groups are, so to speak, the representatives of relatively the most natural and so universal ‘consensual groups (Einverständnigemeinschaften)’. So long as the ‘four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order’ ([1] Gruppe, [2] amorphe Gemeinschaft, [3] Einverständnigemeinschaft, [4] vergesellschaftete Gemeinschaft) is kept in mind, that such groups are nothing but (3) ‘consensual groups’, is too self-evident to apply each time such an exact but awkward expression
‘Nachbarschafts-einverständnigemeinschaft’ and so on. When it is obvious that some power holders appear and maintain the non-enacted orders, not so awkward usual expressions as ‘Hausverband’, ‘Nachbarschaftsverband’ and ‘Sippenverband’, are frequently utilized.

In contrast to these cases, matters stand different regarding such social collectivities or groups as ‘ethnicity’, ‘class’, ‘status group’, ‘party’ and considerably large-scale organization of ‘domination’. Here, it is never self-evident but just a sociological problem, to what stage each collectivity above proceeds on the ‘four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order’.

For example, it may be a fundamental problem of the sociology of ‘social class-formation’, whether a multitude of individuals that commonly share a distinctive ‘class situation’, remain a statistical group or grow to be a real group of various stages of social action (E&S: 532-33, 928-29; 2001b: 255-56). ‘Not-yet-fully-social similar action’ without mutual awareness (i.e., ‘scattered riots’)? Or to ‘amorphous social action’ with still diffuse a feeling of solidarity (i.e., naturally engendered but mutually reinforced ‘booping’), or to consensual action (i.e., mutually consented ‘slow-down’, ‘sabotage’), or further to temporary associational action (i.e., occasionally planned, individual ‘agreed strike’) or finally to perennial association-formation (i.e., ‘trade-union’, ‘class-party’). In those realms, the degree of growth or of dissolution as a social structure, that is, as a social class, must be accurately measured and distinguished each time on the ‘four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order’. So, it is inevitable that the terms ‘consensus and its composites’ as an index of the third stage should be explicitly applied to each case.

Therefore, whether the terms ‘consensus and its composites’ explicitly appear in the text or not does not indicate the specific ‘period’ when the text was written. But it is a distinctive mark, if the social structure as the object treated in that context requires the plain application of the term for a ‘sine qua non’. The ‘four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order’ itself is applied throughout the whole OM irrespective of the ‘period’ when the text was written.

Conclusion

With these proofs stated above, we must conclude that the basic conceptual scheme of the ‘Categories’, the ‘four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order’, has never lost its role as the guiding principle to the whole OM.
Without reading the ‘Categories’ intensively and recapturing the scale beforehand, we could not read the whole OM appropriately according to the author’s original conception and systematization. On the contrary, with the ‘four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order’ of the ‘Categories’ firmly in our minds, we can read the individual sections or chapters of the OM better, closely connected one another beyond each sub-volume, as is illustrated above with the theme ‘Gemeinde’.

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